Principles Underlying the Constitution

Republic—a non-monarchic form of government; translated by Madison into a “representative democracy”

Republicanism: “Is . . . the general form and aspect of the [proposed] government . . . strictly republican? . . . [W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period or during good behavior.” James Madison, Federalist 39.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place . . . . The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. Madison, Federalist 10.

See also the related concepts of “express or enumerated powers”; “liberal democracy”; “limited government” v. totalitarian or omnipotent or absolute (=not conditioned or dependent) government

Federation, confederation, confederacy—no real difference in 18^th century; a union or agreement of independent states to cede some common authority to a central institution; central authority extended to member states, not individuals; a very popular word throughout the American colonies and states; translated by the Framers into a form of government midway between a “confederation” of separate states and a “national,” “unified,” or “popular” government

Federalism:  Opponents of the proposed constitution say “the convention . . . ought . . . to have preserved the federal form, which regards the union as a confederacy of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a national government, which regards the union as a consolidation of the states.”  

“The proposed constitution therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both.” James Madison, Federalist 39. 

Separation of Powers: “In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department [=”branch”] should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that [1] the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. . . [2] the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices.”

“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . .

Federalist 51.

Madison’s Hobbesian Approach

[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” James Madison, Federalist 51.